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RAPE OF THE MENTALLY DEFICIENT:
SATISFACTION OF THE
NONCONSENT ELEMENT
SusAN L. BRODY*

Lack of consent to sexual intercourse has been an element
of the crime of rape for centuries. Its roots go as far back as 1900
B.C. when the first rape law appeared in the Code of Hammurabi. 1 Consent to illicit intercourse under the ancient code not
was also grounds for putting the cononly negated the crime, it
2
senting female to death.
The same attitude toward a woman's consent to extramarital intercourse was reflected one thousand years later in the
laws of Moses. 3 If a woman had sexual intercourse with a man
in the city where her cries would be audible and her resistance
visible, but failed to cry out or resist, she would be stoned to
death. 4 Thus, lack of consent by the victim has always been an
important aspect of rape for which the victim has historically
been held responsible.
The lack of consent by the victim element was incorporated
into the laws of seventeenth century England by use of the language: "against her will." In order for the crime to be complete,
the prosecution was required to prove that the act of sexual intercourse had occurred against the woman's will. 5 That language, combined with the laws of Moses, was codified for the
first time in America, in 1648, in Massachusetts 6 and is retained
* Associate with Beermann, Swerdlove, Woloshin, Barezky & Berkson. Former clerk to the Honorable Lloyd A. VanDeusen, Illinois Appellate
Court, Second District, 1979-1980; J.D. IIT/Chicago-Kent College of Law,
1979; B.S. Ohio State University, 1974. The author wishes to thank Francis
Lenski and William Ensing for their research assistance and support.
1. The Code of Hammurabi was an extensive code of civil and criminal
laws which, according to various sources, was said to have been given to
King Hammurabi, the sixth King of the Semitic Dynasty, by the Son God.
Gold & Wyatt, The Rape System: Old Rules & New Times, 27 CATH. U. L.
REV. 695, 696 n.1 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Gold].
2. Id. at 697 and n.9 quoting THE CODE OF HAMMURABI, KING OF BABY-

LON § 129 (2d ed. 1904).
3. Id. at 698.
4. Id. at 698, 699.
5. Id.

at 699 citing 1 M. HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE

CROWN, 62-68 (1736).
6. Id. at 700.
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in most rape statutes today.7 Though often referred to as the
"consent defense," absence of consent is actually an element of
the crime to be proven by the prosecution.
The Illinois rape statute provides:
(a) A male person of the age of 14 years and upwards who
has sexual intercourse with a female, not his wife, by force and
against her will commits rape ....
8
The statute then lists two circumstances which unequivocally establish the "by force and against her will" element: 9 Intercourse by force and against her will includes, but is not
limited to, any intercourse which occurs in the following situations: (1) Where the female is unconscious; or (2) Where the female is so mentally deranged or deficient that she cannot give
effective consent to intercourse.10 Thus, when the charge of rape
is based upon intercourse with a female who was too mentally
defective or deranged at the time to give her consent, the Illinois
rape statute presumes that the act of intercourse occurred by
force and against her will. First, however, the prosecution must
prove that the victim's mental condition effectively precluded
consent. It is not difficult to conceive of a situation in which an
accused elicits consent, either verbally or by acquiescence, from
a mentally deficient woman and believes that her consent was
authentic. The resulting legal issues are threefold: (1) What
nature and quantum of evidence must the prosecution produce
to establish the deficiency or derangement necessary to negate
consent? (2) By what standards should the court evaluate such
evidence? (3) To what extent, if any, must the prosecution
show that the accused was aware of the victim's mental
incapacity?
The first and second inquiries concern appropriate evidentiary standards, and are fundamental to most types of litigation." Moreover, Illinois courts, 12 as well as those of other
7. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 261 (West 1970-1980 &Supp. 1981); GA.
CODE ANN. § 26-2001 (1977 &Supp. 1981); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-4-1 (Burns
1979); IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.1 (1979); Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02 (Page
1975 &Supp. 1980); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3252 (Supp. 1981). Other statutes
contain general language retaining the common law nonconsent requirement but do not make specific reference to "force." See, e.g., ALASKA STAT.
§ 11.41.410 (1962 & Supp. 1980); Amiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1406 (1978); UTAH

CODE ANN. § 76-5-402 (Supp. 1981).
8. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-1(a) (1979) (emphasis added).
9. Id.at §§ 11-1(a)(1)-(2) (1979) [hereinafter cited as 11-1(a)].
10. Id. (emphasis added).
11. For example, in the criminal context, there is extensive law and theory regarding proof of fitness to stand trial and insanity. In the civil area,
there is substantial law pertaining to mental capacity to sue, to contract and
to make a will.
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states, 13 have adopted a test to determine the victim's capacity
to consent. The controlling question is whether the victim had
mental capacity sufficient to permit her to understand the act,
its nature, and possible consequences. 14 The third inquiry, despite two recent Illinois Appellate Court decisions touching
upon the issue, has never been answered by the Illinois
Supreme Court. 15 Illinois law is unclear as to the degree of
awareness a defendant must have regarding the victim's inability to consent.
This article attempts to illuminate the issue by examining
the Illinois rape statute and related portions of the Illinois Criminal Code. In addition, recent case law will be analyzed with reference to the Code. Public policy and precedent from other
jurisdictions will also be discussed. The focus will then shift to
the author's proposal that prosecutors be uniformly required to
prove the defendant's mental state using precisely articulated
standards. First, however, some insight 16 into the effect of the
accused's ignorance or mistake as to consent, is necessary.
MISTAKE IMPACTS MENTAL STATE

Because lack of consent is a definitional element of rape in
Illinois, the presence of consent' 7 negates the offense. By con12. See, e.g., People v. O'Neal, 50 Ill. App. 3d 900, 365 N.E.2d 1333 (1977);
People v. Blunt, 65 IlM. App. 2d 268, 212 N.E.2d 719 (1965) (a mere showing of
mental incapacity is not enough; capacity must be sufficiently diminished to
preclude consent).
13. See, e.g., People v. Boggs, 107 Cal. App. 492, 290 P. 618 (1930); People
v. Easley, 42 N.Y.2d 50, 396 N.Y.S.2d 635, 364 N.E.2d 1328 (1977); Hacker v.
Stat, 73 Okla. Crim. 119, 118 P.2d 408 (1941); State v. Fox, 72 S.D. 119, 31
N.W.2d 451 (1948).
14. For a discussion of that test and the cases developing it see People v.
McMullen, 91 Ill. App. 3d 184, 188-89, 414 N.E.2d 214, 217 (1980).
15. People v. Farrokhi, 91 Ill. App. 3d 421, 414 N.E.2d 921 (1980); People v.
McMullen, 91 Ill. App. 3d 184, 414 N.E.2d 214 (1980).
16. Ignorance or mistake of fact or law plays an illusory role in substantive criminal law. Discussion herein merely alerts the reader to the complexity of the subject, and hopefully, provides the minimum insight
necessary to appreciate the immediate topic. For more thorough analysis of
"mistake," see W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, HANDBOOK ON CRimINAL LAw 356
(1972) [hereinafter cited as LAFAVE].

17. Whether consent is present is a question of fact. The effect of consent upon the state's case is purely a question of law. Comment, Consent in
the CriminalLaw, 8 HABV. L. REV. 317, 323 (1895) [hereinafter cited as Consent ].

It should be noted that the victim's consent does not necessarily operate as a defense to all crimes against the person; the injury is to the peace of
society, i.e., an offense against the state. For instance, homicide, mayhem,
and battery jeopardize not only the immediate victim, but the public's interest in protecting its citizens as well. These crimes may be committed even
though the individual injured consented to injury. In contrast, most statutory definitions of larceny are inconsistent with "a taking with the owner's
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trast, mistakenly perceived consent does not eliminate the nonconsent element or prevent an objectively cognizable crime
from taking place. The accused's mistake affects only the subjective criminality of the act.
Clearly, some wrongful state of mind, or mens rea, must accompany the act. A crucial preliminary question, however, must
be addressed: must the required mental state (whatever it may
be) accompany each element of the offense? 18 For purposes of
this article, the specific inquiry is whether the mens rea requirement must be specifically proven as to the lack of consent element. If so, the defendant's good-faith belief that he obtained
the victim's consent should negate that element of the crime
and result in acquittal. If not, the mistake at best is a justification or defense precluding conviction only if reasonable; 19 the
prosecutor's primafacie case remains intact.
There is authority in English case law which holds that the
mens rea requirement must accompany each element of the
rape. In Regina v. Morgan,20 four defendants claimed they had
been told by the victim's husband that she enjoyed being forced
to have sexual intercourse. Allegedly believing they had her
consent, defendants overpowered and had sex with the gentleman's wife. The defense at trial was that any belief that the
victim consented negated the intent to commit rape. The jury
was instructed, however, to reach a verdict of guilty unless defendants' belief was reasonable. The instructions reflected the
theory that intent to engage in nonconsensual intercourse is not
an essential element of rape. Defendants appealed to the House
of Lords which took the position that belief that the victim conconsent." Similarly, sexual intercourse is not rape if it's with a consenting

(adult, sane, sober) female. The key to the distinction is the language defining the offense. Where lack of consent is an element of a crime such as
rape, the presence of consent negates the offense.
18. The Model Penal Code suggests that when the relevant statute
prescribes a mental state without distinguishing among the material, objective elements of the offense, the given mental state applies to all elements.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(4) (1962 version).
19. See generally G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAw 698-707
(1978). The author illustrates the distinction between consent as a justification for sexual intercourse and consent as a definitional element of the offense. If consent is of definitional dimension, the accused's mistake i.e. his
belief that the purported victim has consented, suffices for acquittal. If consent is merely a justification, the accused's belief that he obtained consent
must be free from fault and reasonably grounded to preclude liability. In
the latter case, the defendant's belief that the victim consented justifies
rape to the extent that self-defense justifies battery or manslaughter. Id. at
698.
20. 11975] 2 W.L.R. 923.
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sented, however unreasonable, bars conviction in a rape case.2 1
The Lords thus adopted the view that the mental requirement
encompasses each element of the rape. Defendants' belief in
the victim's consent precludes liability.
However, the fact that rape is a general intent crime, 22 supports the argument that a specific mental state need not be
proved for each element of the crime. The defendant may be
convicted of rape even if he did not intend that the intercourse
be nonconsensual or that the victim lack capacity to give consent; his general wrongful state of mind will suffice for conviction. For instance, if defendant has sex with one other than his
spouse, he has manifested an intent to commit adultery; mens
rea is implicit. Similarly, if the defendant obtains the victim's
consent via trickery,23 whether or not a court considers the lack
of consent element satisfied, defendant, at a minimum, has manifested that degree of culpability necessary for the lesser offense
of assault and battery. 24 Again, the wrongful state of mind is
supplied.
The absence of a specific intent requirement, however, may
result in rape convictions for harmless behavior. It is the violence of the crime of rape which offends society, not the act of
intercourse itself; it is the nonconsensual element which society
meant to prohibit. Where defendant does not intend to do precisely the act which society meant to prohibit, he should be punished for a different offense or not punished at all. If the courts
21. Id. Although rejecting the theory of law recited by the lower courts,
the appellate court was not convinced that defendants had any real belief
in the victim's consent and thus affirmed the convictions.
22. People v. Utinans, 55 111. App. 3d 306, 317, 370 N.E.2d 1080, 1087 (1977);
see generally, LAFAVE, supra note 16, at 358.
23. Textual reference to "consent via trickery" raises the issue whether
fraudulently induced consent is legally effective consent. Fraud in the inducement does not vitiateconsent; fraud in thefactum does. For instance,
where defendant obtains consent to enter owner's house and remove a box,
but walks off with a box containing a diamond, fraud is in thefactum, and
the victim's consent is legally ineffective. By contrast, where the rape victim's consent is procured by defendant's promise to marry her, consent,
though fraudulently induced, exists. Although not technically guilty of
rape, the defendant, in such a case, would at least be guilty of the lesser
included offense of assault and battery. Consent, supra note 17, at 321-22.
Fraudulently induced consent should be distinguished from consent
extorted by force or imminent threats. In the former case, consent has been
deceitfully obtained. In the latter case, there has been no actual consent;
the threat negates it. Similarly, no real consent can be elicited from an unconscious, insensible, incompetent or wholly deranged victim. Id. at 321,
n.1.

24. For general discussion of how mistake or ignorance of fact may
render defendant unaware of the magnitude of what he is doing and thus
guilty of some lesser included offense, or no offense at all, see LAFAVE,
supra note 16 at 360.
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refuse to require that some mental state be extended to the lack
of consent element, a rule will be implemented which punishes
solely for sex and nothing else. The balance of this article assumes, therefore, that whichever mental state applies to rape, it
attaches to the nonconsent element as well. The inevitable conclusion is that mistake as to consent undercuts the general intent to rape as that offense is defined in Illinois. The sections
which follow concentrate upon which mental state should be
applied.
The Illinois Rape Statute
As noted, rape is a general intent crime 25 and not a strict
liability offense. 26 Accordingly, the Illinois rape statute does not
prescribe a specific mental state,2 7 but rather, as indicated by
Section 4-3(b) of the Criminal Code, the requirement may be
satisfied in any of three ways: intent; knowledge; or recklessness. 28 Either of the three may apply to a defendant's awareness of his victim's mental capability.
Under the Illinois Criminal Code, 29 "(a) person intends, or
acts intentionally or with intent to accomplish a result or engage
in conduct described by the statute defining the offense, when
his conscious objective orpurpose is to accomplish that result or
'30
engage in that conduct.
The Illinois knowledge requirement is satisfied where the
accused is consciously aware of the existence of circumstances
which, by statute, render his conduct criminal; a person is said
to have knowledge of a materialfact when he has an awareness
of the substantialprobabilitythat such facts exist;31 a person is
said to have knowledge of the result of his conduct when he is
consciously aware that a certain result is practicallycertain to
be caused by his conduct. 32 Reckless conduct occurs when a
25. People v. Marchese, 32 IM.App. 3d 872, 336 N.E.2d 795, 804 (1975).
26. See ILL.REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 4-9 (1979). For a discussion of the factors
considered in determining whether an offense is one for which the legislature intended absolute liability, see ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 4-9, Committee
Comments (Smith-Hurd 1961). See also People v. Nunn, 77 Ill.
2d 243, 24950, 396 N.E.2d 27, 29-30 (1979); People v. Malone, 71 111. App. 3d 231, 232-33, 389
N.E.2d 908, 909-910 (1979).
27. See ILT. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-1 (1979).
28. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 4-3(b) (1979) [hereinafter referred to in text
as 4-3(b)]; People v. Utinans, 55 Ill.
App. 3d 306, 315, 370 N.E.2d 1080, 1087
(1977). For a discussion of the meaning of these mental states see United
States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394 (1980). See also People v. Parr, 35 IM.App. 3d
539, 541, 341 N.E.2d 439, 441 (1976).
29. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 4-3 through 4-6 (1979).
30. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 4-4 (1979) (emphasis added).
31. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 4-5(a) (1979) (emphasis added).
32. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 4-5(b) (1979) (emphasis added).
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person acts and consciously disregardsa substantialand unjustifiable risk that circumstancesexist or that a result will follow,
and such disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person
would exercise under
33
the same or similar circumstances.
Thus, under the Illinois Criminal Code, an Illinois prosecutor could secure a rape conviction under Section 11-1 (a) (2) 34 by
showing: (1) that the defendant had a conscious objective or
purpose (intent) to rape a mentally deficient person; or (2) that
he was consciously aware of the circumstances surrounding the
victim's inability to consent or that he was aware of a substantial probability that the victim was, in fact, mentally deficient
(knowledge); or (3) that he consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the victim was mentally deficient
(recklessness).
On its face, Section 4-3(b) indicates that any of the three
mental states will suffice for a rape conviction where the victim
is shown to be mentally deranged or deficient. In two recent
cases which have touched upon the issue, the defendants argued that the state should be required to prove at least knowledge i.e. that recklessness should not be sufficient for a
conviction.
The Illinois Decisions
People v. McMullen

35

On November 20, 1978, Mark McMullen and two other school
boys lured a sixteen year old girl into a small room at school,
pulled her pants down and had sexual intercourse with her.
While McMullen took his turn, one of the other boys held her
hands to the ground. The victim walked home after the occurrence and neither reported the incident to her parents nor to
36
any school authorities.
The evidence revealed that the victim lived with her father,
stepmother and two younger sisters. She was enrolled in spe37
cial education classes for the educably mentally handicapped.
The victim's stepmother testified regarding the victim's capabilities. She never traveled by herself, could not find her way
around her home town and was incapable of shopping alone be-

33. ILL. REV.
34.
35.
36.
37.

STAT.

ch. 38, § 4-6 (1979) (emphasis added).

See notes 8-9 and accompanying text supra.
People v. McMullen, 91 ml. App. 3d 184, 414 N.E.2d 214 (1980).
Id. at 186, 414 N.E.2d at 215.
Id.
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cause she didn't understand the value of money.38 She was
given only a few menial tasks to perform at home but was
39
manipulated easily into performing her sisters' chores as well.
Expert evidence disclosed that the victim had the mental
ability of a beginning second-grader. Whereas a mean score for
social reasoning and judgment is 10, the victim's score for those
areas was 2.40 The expert opined that the victim could not "comprehend the meaning, circumstances, responsibility, conse41
quences and nature of sexual activity."
The court instructed the jury that McMullen could be found
guilty of rape either because (1) he committed an act of sexual
intercourse with the victim by force and against her will; or
(2) had intercourse with the victim when she was so mentally
deranged or deficient that she could not effectively consent to
intercourse. 42 The jury returned a general verdict of guilty. It is
thus unknown upon which grounds for rape the jury based its
43
decision.
The Appellate Court for the Fourth District found ample evidence to support the verdict on either ground." Regarding the
latter, the court found the victim so mentally deranged or deficient that she could not effectively consent. 45 The defendant
urged that the state be required to prove defendant's knowledge
of the victim's mental incompetency.
The court did not expressly address the contention that
knowledge should be required. Instead, it found that those acts
by the defendant which constituted force also justified a finding
of intent.4 Assuming defendant's normal mental ability, the
court reasoned that the act of pulling the victim's pants down
while her hands were held down demonstrated force and consequently, intent. 47 Alternatively, the court stated that, if the defendant had subnormal mental abilities, the circumstances were
sufficient to justify a finding that defendant acted recklessly
with respect to the victim's mental condition. 48 In effect, the
38. Id.

39. Id.
40. Id. at 186-87, 414 N.E.2d at 215.
41. Id. at 187, 414 N.E.2d at 216.
42. For discussion of this standard see notes 12-14 and accompanying
text supra.
43. Id. at 187, 414 N.E.2d at 216.
44. So long as the indictment contains a single valid charge, a general
finding of guilt will be upheld. Id. at 187, 414 N.E.2d at 216.
45. Id. at 188-89, 414 N.E.2d at 216-17.
46. Id. at 190, 414 N.E.2d at 218.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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court ruled that evidence of either intent or recklessness would
establish the mens rea requirement set forth under section 43(b) of the Criminal Code. The court was satisfied that McMullen intended to have sex with a mentally deficient victim; it did
not debate the wisdom of using a recklessness standard.
49

People v. Farrokhi

Medhi Farrokhi met Angela Waters on June 27, 1979.50 Farrokhi had been delivering newspapers when he noticed Angela
sitting in front of her home. He gave her a newspaper and she
smiled. The two spoke and he told her he'd return after he
finished delivering papers. Upon his return, Angela entered his
51
car and they sat inside listening to the radio.
Defendant testified that, upon Angela's suggestion, they
went to his apartment where they had sexual intercourse. 52 After a bench trial, the court convicted defendant of rape 53 and defendant appealed.
Whether the victim lacked the mental capacity to give effective consent was not an issue on appeal.5 4 Defendant's main
contention was that he could not be convicted unless the state
proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he had knowledge of
the complainant's mental inability to give effective consent. The
state argued, inter alia, that it satisfied the general intent requirement where it proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
defendant was merely reckless55with regard to ascertaining the
mental condition of the victim.

The Appellate Court for the Second District affirmed the
trial court's decision without committing itself to the proposition
that the state must prove knowledge. Determining that the trial
court used a knowledge and not a recklessness standard,5 6 the
appellate court appropriately limited its review to a consideration of whether defendant knew of his victim's handicap.
The court concluded, after a review of the evidence, that the
victim's limited mental abilities and lack of knowledge about the
nature and consequences of sex made it unlikely or improbable
49. 91 Il. App. 3d 421, 414 N.E.2d 921 (1980).
50. Id. at 423, 414 N.E.2d at 924.
51. Id. at 424, 414 N.E.2d at 924.
52. Id.

53. Id. at 422, 414 N.E.2d at 922 (defendant was convicted of rape and

sentenced to a term of six years in jail).
54. Id. at 423, 414 N.E.2d at 923.

55. Id. at 422, 414 N.E.2d at 923. (alternatively, the state argued that the

provision in issue, i.e. the nonconsent provision, required no proof of mens

rea; this theory was rejected by the court).
56. Id. at 423, 414 N.E.2d at 923.
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that nineteen year old Angela knew how to perform the act or
understood its nature.5 7 Moreover, the court found that the defendant could not possibly have been oblivious to the victim's
obvious mental deficiencies. Her speech was poor, difficult to
understand and frequently unintelligible. Her expressive vocabulary skills were comparable to a four year old's. She could
print her name but could not add four plus four or read. Expert
evidence revealed her I.Q. score at 35 and a mental age of between 4 and 6 1/2 years. Two psychiatrists opined that Angela
was severely mentally retarded.5 8 The court ruled that the circumstances were sufficient to establish a mental state of knowledge by defendant and found the record sufficient to support a
finding that defendant knew the victim was so mentally deficient
that she was incapable of effective consent.5 9 The court did not
rule on whether recklessness would, under any circumstances,
be sufficient to convict a defendant under Section 11-1(a) (2) because it was procedurally bound to evaluate only the defendant's knowledge.
Analysis
Should a Definite Mental State Be Uniformly Applied?
Neither the McMullen nor the Farrokhi courts satisfactorily
resolve the issue whether the prosecution must prove
knowledge under Section 11-1(a)(2). McMullen relies heavily
upon the express language of Section 4-3(b) of the Code 60 which
indicates that any of the three mental states suffice if the statute
defining the offense prescribes no specific mental state. The
Farrokhi court similarly avoided a determination as to the propriety of using any mental state other than knowledge because
of procedural restraints and also because the circumstantial evidence indicating that defendant had such knowledge was
overwhelming.
If any of the three mental states will suffice, defendants are
very much at the mercy of prosecutorial discretion. 6 1 Clearly,
the mental state criterion under which defendants will be tried
will vary from one case to the next. Such unpredictability puts
the defendant at a distinct disadvantage. A clearly articulated
57. Id. at 427-28, 414 N.E.2d at 926-27.
58. Id. at 427, 414 N.E.2d at 926.
59. Id. at 427-28, 414 N.E.2d at 926-27.
60. 91 Ill. App. 3d at 190, 414 N.E.2d at 218.
61. People v. Gold, 38 Ill. 2d 510, 232 N.E.2d 702, cert. denied, 392 U.S. 940
(1968). Gold states that in the case of a general intent offense such as rape,
the state need not allege a specific mental state. Thus, the pleadings do not
apprise the defendant of the theory under which he will be prosecuted.
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standard is necessary to anticipate the state's attorney's trial
strategy and to evaluate the relevance of evidence. Arguably,
the lack of a clear standard is unfair from a constitutional standpoint.6 2 Unquestionably, it creates strategic obstacles to
defense.
The extent to which the defendant's mental deficiency succeeds as a defense logically depends upon the degree of awareness necessary to convict. Assume that a court requires the
mental state of knowledge, a degree of awareness falling somewhere between intent and recklessness. A relatively minor
mental deficiency would likely render the defendant incapable
of achieving the requisite mental state. If, however, the required mental state is recklessness, a lesser level of awareness,
a more severely diminished capacity of the defendant would be
necessary to vitiate the requisite mental state and preclude conviction. A defense attorney who cannot count on the application
of a definite standard will be unable to evaluate the probable
success of a diminished capacity defense. In both Farrokhi and
McMullen counsel attempted to utilize the accused's mental inadequacy as a defense.
In Farrokhi,the defendant, an Iranian, testified that he had
very poor command of the English language, that he spoke infrequently except with his Iranian friends, and that he took the job
63
delivering papers so that he would not have to talk to anyone.
The state presented evidence to the contrary. The police sargeant who spoke with Farrokhi on the night of the incident testified that he was able to communicate effectively with defendant,
that he never had to repeat anything, and that defendant never
asked questions.64 The chief of police testified that Farrokhi
65
spoke English properly and had no difficulty communicating.
The circulation manager for the newspaper which hired defendant to deliver the papers testified that defendant had no difficulty in filling out the employment application. Defendant's
supervisor at a prior job testified that defendant had some difficulty speaking English but none in understanding it. In addition, Farrokhi had been in this country for two years and had
66
completed at least two semesters of college.
The court, therefore, found frivolous, defendant's contention
that language difficulties prevented him from ascertaining the
62.
vague
63.
64.
65.
66.

Defendant's due process rights are implicated where he has only a
notion of the charges levelled against him.
91 IlM. App. 3d at 424-25, 414 N.E.2d at 924.
Id. at 425, 414 N.E.2d at 924-25.
Id.
Id. at 423, 414 N.E.2d at 923.
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victim's mefital deficiency. 67 It also found overwhelming the evi-

dence of defendant's normal mental capacity. That evidence
coupled with indicators of Angela's mental inability convinced
the Appellate Court for the Second District to affirm the
conviction.
In McMullen, the trial court refused to admit evidence of defendant's mental deficiencies. 68 Mr. Justice Craven, in a vigorous dissent, pointed out the incongruity of employing the
victim's incompetence as a theory of prosecution while ignoring
the comparable incompetence of the accused. 69 While the dissent states that it would reverse and remand for a new trial with
directions to allow evidence of defendant's mental deficiencies,
it gives no guidance as to what degree the defendant's mental
deficiency must be established to avoid a conviction.
Farrokhi and McMullen thus illustrate the confusion created by the absence of straightforward criteria. Two problems
emerge: whether and when to admit evidence of defendant's
mental deficiency, and if the evidence is admissible, how to
gauge its significance against the backdrop of the victim's
mental handicap.
Which Mental State Should be Utilized?
Knowledge should be the mental state uniformly applied to
rape cases under Section 11-1 (a) (2). The prosecution should be
required to plead and prove that defendant knew his victim to
be mentally deficient or deranged, or the lack of such knowledge
should be available as an affirmative defense. Illinois authority
supports that conclusion.
In People v. Utinans,70 the Illinois Appellate Court for the
First District required a "knowledge" mental state. 71 Defendant
argued that he did not knowingly participate in the rape and
that the codefendants committed the act. He further claimed
that he had no knowledge that any of the acts performed were
against the victim's will.72 While the case did not concern the

rape of a mentally deficient victim, the court announced that its
decision would depend upon whether there was sufficient evidence in the record from which the jury could find that defendant acted knowingly. 73 Utinans thus supports a conclusion that
knowledge is the applicable mental state for all rape cases.
67. Id. at 425-26, 414 N.E.2d at 925.
68. 91 Ml1. App. 3d at 191,414 N.E.2d at 218-19 (Craven, J. dissenting).

69. Id. at 191, 414 N.E.2d at 219.
App. 3d 306, 370 N.E.2d 1080 (1977).
70. 55 Ill.
71. Id. at 315, 370 N.E.2d at 1087.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 317, 370 N.E.2d at 1087.
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Under Section 11-4 of the Criminal Code-Indecent Liberties with a Child 7 -- the accused's knowledge of the victim's age
is essential. The Indecent Liberties statute provides that a person 17 years of age or more commits that offense when he or she
submits to or performs, inter alia, an act of sexual intercourse
with a child under 16 years of age. 75 The statute further provides that if the accused reasonably believed the child was 16 or
76
older, such will constitute an affirmative defense.
Section 11-4 does not expressly establish a knowledge requirement. The "reasonable belief' provision signifies, theoretically, that the accused's reasonable mistake as to the victim's
age justifies the act. 77 The Committee Comments to that section, however, state that the gist of the offense is the knowing
and deliberate victimization of a child's immaturity;78 conceivably, lack of knowledge negates the offense. Section 11-1(a) (2)
does not contain a reasonable belief provision; therefore, convictions may be easier to obtain under Section 11-1 (a) (2) than
under Section 11-4.
Infants and mentally deficient adults alike are especially
vulnerable to criminal assault. There is no reason to believe
that the legislature sought to provide better protection for handicapped adults than it sought to provide for children. 79 Indeed, a
woman's mental capacity may be less discernable than her
chronological age. If ignorance is a defense under 11-4, it should
also be available under 11-1 (a) (2).
Moreover, rape is a Class X felony; 80 indecent liberties with
a child is a Class 1 felony. 81 The mental requirement applicable
74. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-4 (1979).
75. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-4(a) (1979).
76. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-4(c) (1979). It is noteworthy that both the
sex crime of contributing to the sexual delinquency of a child, ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, § 11-5 (1979) and that of Indecent Solicitation of a Child, ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-6 (1979) expressly provide that it is not a defense that
the accused reasonably believed the child to be of the age required therein.
Those crimes, however, are misdemeanors and the sentence for each is substantially less than that for Indecent Liberties. In fact, the Committee Comments to the Indecent Solicitation statute specifically state that one of the
policy reasons for precluding mistakes of age as a defense is because the
offense is a misdemeanor. For these reasons, the Indecent Liberties statute
lends itself more easily to analogy with the rape statute.

77. See note 19 infra.
78. Committee Comments ILL. ANN.STAT., ch. 38, § 11-4, 210-11 (SmithHurd 1972).
79. For an excellent elaboration of this argument see Brief for DefendApp. 3d 421, 414 N.E.2d 921 (1980).
ant-Appellant, People v. Farrokhi, 91 Ill.
80. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-1(c) (1979).
81. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-4(e) (1979).
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to the greater offense, rape, should be at least as stringent as
that required to convict of the lesser offense.
Public policy considerations also favor a finding that a defendant know of a victim's mental inability to consent to intercourse in order to be guilty of rape. Societal mores and values
have changed since the offense of rape was first codified. Many
people enter into sexual relationships quite casually. Naivete
about sex, even among teenagers, is no longer typical or expected. Conceivably, defendant may not have been availed of an
opportunity to evaluate the victim's mental condition. More importantly, he may have underestimated the importance of doing
SO.
Committee Comments to Section 4-3, the section describing
mental states,82 note that crimes involving recklessness are
much less common than those involving knowledge.8 3 One can
speculate that the reason stems from a reluctance by the courts
to impose severe sanctions unless a defendant acted with a sufficiently wrongful state of mind. Where the crime is a felony, the
courts should be particularly wary of convicting without evidence of a culpable mental state. Rape is a class X felony 84 punishable by a minimum of six and a maximum of thirty years in
jail.8 5 It is unconscionable that a defendant can be sentenced to

such a term absent the requirement of a specific mental state.
Finally, many other jurisdictions provide that an essential
element of the crime of rape of a mentally deficient victim is the
defendant's knowledge of the victim's mental incapacity.86 Several do so by express statutory language; others by judicial interpretation. 87 Only a few jurisdictions have found the
accused's knowledge or lack of knowledge immaterial to the issue of guilt.88

Based on the foregoing, knowledge should be the mental
state required of a defendant accused of raping a victim who is
mentally deficient or deranged. A defendant should not be con82. Committee Comments ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 4-3 at 253-62 (SmithHurd 1972).
83. Committee Comments IL.ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 4-3 at 257-58 (SmithHurd 1972).
84. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-1(c) (1979).
85. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-1(a) (3) (1979).
86. Annot., 31 ALR3d 1227, 1230 (1970).
87. Among the states which have codified the knowledge requirement
are Indiana, Ohio, and Texas. States which have imposed the requirement

judicially are California, Georgia, Iowa, Kentucky, Missouri, Pennsylvania,
and Vermont. For a full discussion of the cases, see Annot., 31 ALR3d 1227,
1249-76 (1970).
88. Those states are Minnesota and Washington. For a full discussion
see Annot., 31 ALR3d 1227, 1271 (1970).
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victed and sent to jail for years unless it is proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he had knowledge of the victim's mental
infirmity or unless he was permitted to present his ignorance of
her condition as an affirmative defense. Analysis of Illinois case
law and statutes, public policy considerations, legislative intent
and the law in other jurisdictions overwhelmingly support the
conclusion.
The Future
McMullen 89 and Farrokhi90 indicate a case by case approach
to the issue of defendant's mental state for the rape of a mentally deficient person. Until the Illinois Supreme Court decides
the issue of which mental state, if any, should be uniformly applied, it is likely that courts will continue to decide cases on an
.ad hoc basis. The language of Section 4-3(b), which indicates
that any of three mental states may be applied if the statute defining the offense charged prescribes no particular mental state,
and the absence of such a provision in the rape statute, leads
one to suspect that the Illinois Supreme Court will not easily be
persuaded to require knowledge of the victim's incapacity to
consent in rape cases. More likely, the courts will defer to the
legislature; any change in the way the cases are decided will be
the result of a legislative amendment to Section 11-1(a) (2).

89. IH.App. 3d 184, 414 N.E.2d 214 (1980).
90. IlM. App. 3d 414,441 N.E.2d 921 (1980).

